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Abstract. Internet of Things (IoT) occupies a vital aspect of our every-
day lives. IoT networks composed of smart-devices which communicate
and transfer the information without the physical intervention of hu-
mans. Due to such proliferation and autonomous nature of IoT systems
make these devices threatened and prone to a severe kind of threats.
In this paper, we introduces a behavior capturing, and verification pro-
cedures in blockchain supported smart-IoT systems that can be able to
show the trust-level confidence to outside networks. We defined a custom
Behavior Monitor and implement on a selected node that can extract
the activity of each device and analyzes the behavior using deep ma-
chine learning strategy. Besides, we deploy Trusted Execution Technol-
ogy (TEE) which can be used to provide a secure execution environment
(enclave) for sensitive application code and data on the blockchain. Fi-
nally, in the evaluation phase we analyze various IoT devices data that is
infected by Mirai attack. The evaluation results show the strength of our
proposed method in terms of accuracy and time required for detection.
Keywords: Security · Privacy · IOT · Blockchain · Trust · Behavior ·
Neural Network
1 Introduction
Currently, in the modern world Internet of Things (IoT) is swiftly growing and
involved in every aspect of our daily computations. According to the industry-
leading experts’ argument that more than 50 billion of IoT devices will be de-
ployed by 2020 [2]. Things in IoT are the collection of web-enabled devices that
use embedded processors, sensors, micro-controllers and communication hard-
ware (exchange of data from different environments). Such rich communication
in IoT devices generates an enormous dataset which in turn to use for various
dependent services.
Apart from this, IoT allows the advancement in several areas such as home to
smart-home, cities to smart-cities, school to smart-school, health-care to smart-
health-care, and etc. The concept behind this ecosystem is the diversity of things
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that outputs in a large-scale devices. Each connected device (physical or virtual)
in the system, should be trackable and the generated information from the device
can be retrievable by other users regardless of their locations [17]. Nevertheless,
it is necessary that only authorized users can have access to the system and its
resources. Otherwise, it may face several security concerns such as data modi-
fication, identity theft and information leakage. Moreover, security and privacy
problems remain a demanding challenge in such a giant scale adoption of IoT
because of the following reasons: (1) Mostly the communications between these
IoT devices are wireless which make the system more susceptible to different
attacks, i.e. message tampering, eavesdropping and denial-of-service attacks like
mirai attack [5] etc. (2) Devices from different company-makers have resource
constraints limitation such as processing power, battery and memory capacity
that do not allow to deploy advanced security solutions.
Numerous solutions concerning security and privacy for IoT environments
have been proposed that provide the mainstream security requirements i.e. con-
fidentiality, integrity and authentication [23]. However, due to its heterogeneous
nature and having low resource devices, existing solutions cannot fulfill the de-
sired security requirements in the upcoming large-scale IoT paradigm. Even
though some security based solutions are efficient and secure but are commonly
based on centralized mechanisms. A known mechanism of PKI (Public Key In-
frastructure) faces with scalability issues in case of million nodes.
Moving towards decentralized architectures, Block-chain (BC) technology has
acquired an enormous attention in regard to tackling security, anonymity, trace-
ability and centralization. Ethereum [33] a famous public blockchain project was
introduced in 2014 that run smart-contracts for BC participants to write and
execute the application code in a distributed way. Basically, Blockchain is a dis-
tributed ledger technology where each operation such as read, create, update
and delete, is recorded in the form of a transaction. Any unauthorized user ac-
cessing data or any operations on the existing data can, therefore, be detected.
Furthermore, smart contracts are used to enforce the policies of access control
on the existing stored data. A number of researches have shown the integration
of BC technology in different IoT use-cases [8] [15] [32] [7] [14] [10] [31] [12].
Problem Statement and Contribution:
As from the current research proposals, it has been found that blockchain has
become a promising technology to meet the future of IoT security and privacy
requirements [13] [20]. Several Authors [16] [15] [30] [18] [17] put efforts in de-
centralized security mechanisms for upcoming large-scale IoT systems. But the
limitation to all the approaches is that: there is no device-level trust that can
prove any particular zone to external entities in case of supposing the communi-
cation to occur between different IoT networks. The contribution of this paper
are as follows:
1. Implement a custom Behavior Monitor in IoT-Blockchain setup that can
store & monitor IoT devices data and classify its behavior (normal or mali-
cious) to prevent attacks.
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2. Applying a filter on sensor-level that can stabilise output from single/multiple
sensors to avoid faulty or malicious sensors in the network.
3. To implement Trusted Execution Environment (TEE)) on a local blockchain
of each IoT-Zone that ensure the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive
application code and data.
2 Background
2.1 Internet of Things (IoT)
The Internet of Things is the interconnection of smart-devices, mechanical and
digital machines, objects and people which are capable of transferring data over
the network without any human intervention. On the broader scale, IoT ap-
plications areas are smart-homes, smart-cities, smart-healthcare etc. The major
components [4] in IoT ecosystem includes:
– Smart-devices & Sensors: The first layer is the device connectivity layer of
IoT network, which constitutes different sensors like temperature sensor and
thermostat, humidity sensor and many more.
– Connectivity: Devices in IoT are connected to low power wireless networks
like LoRAWAN, ZigBee and Wifi etc.
– Gateway: It acts as a middle layer between devices and manages the bi-
directional transmission between networks and protocol. One of the key
function of a gateway is to translate different protocols and make them
interoperable.
– Cloud: This component integrates billion of sensors, smart-devices gateways,
data storage and provides different predictive analytics.
– Analytics: This is the process of converting the raw data (analog) of billion
of devices into useful insights which can be further used for detailed analysis.
2.2 Blockchain - a decentralized technology
Blockchain technology was initially introduced and brought in 2008 and used
by a remarkable known cryptocurrency, Bitcoin [26]. It is a decentralized ledger
technology that builds on a peer-to-peer network. Each node in the BC network
holds an updated ledger copy that can hinder from a single point of failure. In
the previous few years, the blockchain mostly based on cryptocurrencies such as
[26] [9] in order to catch and addressed the double-spending problem. However,
recently numerous other areas have been explored like IoT networks, where the
blockchain can be set up to create and maintain digital transaction records in a
secure and distributed fashion.
The ledger in BC is composed of blocks, and each block contains two parts.
The first part represents the transaction (must be stored in a database), which
can be of any kind, such as patient record, network traffic log, goods transaction
etc. The second part includes the header detail such as hash of current trans-
action, concatenated previous hash and a timestamp. Thus, storage in this way
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Fig. 1. Inter-Linked Blocks in Blockchain
makes a sequenced block of linked chain as shown in Figure 1. Furthermore,
if a new transaction starts, it will first add to certain block. Secondly, miners
verify the block contain the transaction according to already defined rules. After
verification process, a group of miners perform a consensus strategy to validate
the transactions. Finally, upon successful validation the verified transaction is
ready to append in the BC ledger.
2.3 Blockchain and IoT Systems
IoT devices generate a large amount of data, that must be appropriately stored
and analyzed for useful purposes. For each operation (create, update, delete,
read) from IoT devices, the data can be treated in the form of transaction in
the BC-blocks. Device identity information can be registered in a block such
as manufacturer identity and the live-status of the device where it is located.
Smart-contracts are used to enforce access control policies for IoT devices which
can identify and detect unauthorized access. There is no need for a centralized
authority for storage, such as cloud configuration, for IoT protection. Blockchain
provides data authenticity, data integrity, traceability and prevents from unau-
thorized access. Blockchain technology can also enable a secure channel of mes-
saging between IoT devices. Exchange of messages from one device to another
device can be handle like financial transactions flow in crypto-currencies, such
as ethereum [33] and Bitcoin [26].
2.4 Blockchain Security Solutions for IoT
The decentralized fashion of blockchain makes it a promising security solution
for IoT paradigm. IoT and blockchain integration enables a higher and sound
security level that could not be accomplished by any other technology or nearly
impossible. Some of the recent research proposals in regards to IoT security with
blockchain are as follows:
In [21], authors proposed a blockchain-based approach for managing IoT
devices and configurations. A unique paired-key (Public & Private) is assigned
to each device in the network. The private key is kept inside device and the public
key is registered as a transaction in the blockchain. An IoT device can then be
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reached and access through ethernet by its public key. Hence, it is concluded
that the management and control of IoT devices through blockchain is possible.
A study proposed in [24], which make use of blockchain for secure firmware
updates in IoT devices where traffic directly to the network server is replaced
by local designated peers in the blockchain. The manufacturer is responsible to
store the hashes of updated firmware on the blockchain peers that can be easily
accessible to all the IoT nodes.
IoT devices using in medical and healthcare zone are also exposed to the same
security and privacy limitations. In the case of health-care IoT system, it must
be attack resistant and reliable enough. User safety and privacy is very critical
and must be protected from any malfunction caused by a security incident or im-
precise/faulty device. The risk of device malfunction can overcome in blockchain
by immutable ledger technology. Nichol et al. [28] proposed the feasibility of BC
in order to provide reliability in medical IoT devices. At the beginning when a
device is manufactured and installed, a hash of UID (unique identifier) along
with the other relevant information like manufacturer information, are stored in
BC. Afterwards, this data will be updated with doctor-name, patient-history,
and information about the hospital. The doctors and patients can be automat-
ically informed about the device status like battery expiry, irregularities found
in patient health.
2.5 Blockchain & Trusted Execution Environment (TEEs)
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) [3][1] have been utilized to enhance se-
curity and efficiency in the blockchain protocol. TEEs ensure confidentiality and
integrity to the sensitive part of application code in the system, until and unless
the CPU is not attempted physically by an attacker. TEEs also support remote
attestation [22], that allows remote systems to verify the health of software with
genuine TEE.
Intel provided TEEs functionality in Software Guard Extension (SGX) [3].
SGX is a set of CPU instructions inside Intel’s x86 processor design which can
allow creating an isolated environment for the execution of selected pieces of code
in protected areas called enclaves. These enclaves are designed to run software in
a trustworthy environment, even on a system (host) where the operating system
and memory are untrusted. There are three main functions of enclaves which
are isolation, sealing and attestation. A short description are as follows:
– Isolation: Data and code inside the enclave part are protected and no access
is allowed, such as read or alter by any external process.
– Sealing: Data that is supposed to send it to host environment should be
encrypted and authenticated with a seal key.
– Attestation: Remote systems or parties are allowed to verify an application
enclave identity, credentials and other data.
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3 Related Work
Currently, several types of research have been proposed in the integration of
blockchain and IoT. A few of them have shown interest to help IoT security
requirements. This section describes some of the past research proposals that
intend to realize such integration, mainly for security needs.
Raja et al.[15] demonstrate blockchain-based architecture for smart-home
setting. The architecture consists of three different blockchain networks: a local-
BC (private), a share BC (private) and overlay BC (public). Although this re-
search solves the issue of identification, still it has some shortcomings such as (1)
For each operation it happened to make at least eight communication links that
can flood the network quickly in case of high activity of IoT devices. (2) Local
BC’s are controlled by centralized entity which is opposite to the main principle
of BC - a decentralized technology.
In [29], authors study existing proposed models of access control systems and
argue regarding these systems are not effective in the upcoming large-scale IoT.
In order to avoid centralized mechanisms, this proposed research implements
capability and access control as a sub-component in a blockchain environment.
The other components are data management protocol, messaging service and
data storage system. The messaging service deals with the exchange of access
control message among two parties with defined roles. The messaging service
then sends a request to the data storage system, where it is stored in the form
of block. Finally, the receiving party fetch the message from the BC block using
the messaging service. Moreover, they defined four roles, i.e. data owner, data
source, requester and endorser.
A mechanism named as chainanchor proposed in [18] based on the autho-
rization of IoT devices in the cloud network. It helps device-owner being re-
warded upon selling their device data to a service provider and ensure a privacy-
preserving communication between owner and service-provider. But this ap-
proach is not suitable in most IoT use-cases, because the main scope of this
research is full anonymity and IoT devices sometimes need device identification.
Patrick et al. [16] introduced a decentralized authentication scheme for IoT
devices. In this scheme they declare a separate virtual zones for each use-case
such as healthcare zone, smart-school zone for robust identification of smart-
devices. Each zone has a group master who is responsible to create a groupID
and communicate with blockchain. Each device or follower in a zone gets a
ticket signed by their respective zone master. When a device or follower wants
to initiate a transaction, an association request signed by private-key is send to
their respective zone master. Upon receiving the request, BC verifies its integrity
with the public key of follower. Afterwards, the follower ticket is verified using
the master public key. If the ticket found valid, BC stores the association of
followerID with their groupID for further correspondence, otherwise discarded.
However, the limitation of this approach is that there is no mechanism that can
provide trust-level confidence in each zone to prove it to the outside community.
To summarize, the majority of these current research proposals follows the
same security schemes provided by existing BC technologies, i.e. Bitcoin [26],
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Ethereum [33] etc. However, there is no awareness towards device level trust
that means to know the status of running IoT device, whether it is normal or
malicious.
Untrusted Part
Trusted Function
Call ();
..
Return ();
Trusted Part (Enclave)
IoT Behavior Monitor
Composer (Smart Contract)
Hyper-Ledger Fabric
Consensus Algorithm
Validator
LedgerDataset
Hashing ();
(IoT Transactions)
Key-Storage
Encryption
Fig. 2. IoT secure behavior capturing and storage environment using TEE
4 Proposed Framework
The main goal of the proposed framework (cf. Figure 4) is to add and implement
a security module for behavior monitoring on IoT-zones in a blockchain setup. As
discussed in [16], authors declare zones for different use-cases of IoT. However,
they do not consider the devices itself in case of infected behavior. Furthermore,
there is no mechanism that can show the trust-Level confidence of each zone
when an external entity needs to know before establishing connection. In this
research, we extend the above scheme and add a behavior monitoring module on
each zone. A separate local-BC is configured on each zone that is used to store
the activity of each zone and provides the trust-level confidence to the other
zones.
All the communications passes betwen devices are considered as transactions
and must be direct through the blockchain for validation. For example, if node
A need to send a message to node B, then A must first send the message to
blockchain. If BC validates and authenticates the message from A, then B is
finally allowed to read the message.
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Hardware Model
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Raspberry pi-0
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Sensor Sensor SensorSensorSensor
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Fig. 3. Hardware Model for IoT Zone
4.1 Initialization & System Functioning
In the first phase of deployment, a single device from each zone is designated
as a Main or Master node, which can be considered as a certification authority
(CA). Any node can be defined as a master, but in this case, we assigned to the
node that is more resource capable and powerful. All the other nodes in each
zone are known as follower. Every Master node creates a groupID and send a
signed ticket to each follower for identification. For the first transaction of any
follower, it must require authentication. After that, an association of the follower
and master are stored in the BC for future correspondence.
Hardware Model of IoT The hardware architecture we use in our proposed
framework for prototyping consists of multiple raspberry pi’s. The main/master
node is configured on raspberry pi-3 for the sake of more resources. Followers
or clients node work on raspberry pi-0 with a direct connection to sensors and
other digital devices. Wifi is used for communication between master nodes,
and follower communicates to their sensors using serial or I2C communication
protocol as shown in Figure 3.
Every device is assigned by a key pair that consists of a public and private
key. The private key is stored in follower (pi-0), while the corresponding public
key is stored in their respective master node (pi-3). The connection between the
follower and master node is established through WebSocket. Upon a connection
request from follower to master, the follower must be required to send digital
signature. Afterwards, master node should validate the digital signature in the
blockchain before a secure WebSocket authorisation.
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Improving Sensor Level Data Accuracy In order to improve sensor level
security, the data acquisition procedure will use Kalman filter to make a data
model based on single/multiple sensor readings and covariance. For example, the
position of a drone can be estimated in 3-axis based on GPS, but GPS alone
cannot guarantee accurate altitude. Similarly, a Barometer data can drift based
on different weather conditions at same altitude. Radar or Lidar will output
the altitude value from the ground, but if an obstacle supposed to happen be-
tween the ground and radar the readings might become inaccurate. To avoid
such discrepancies, Kalman filter uses data from all the 3 sensors GPS, barom-
eter and radar/lidar, to predict the correct value (3D location) based on the
covariance. This way if a faulty or malicious sensor found, the Kalman filter will
automatically filter out the data from that sensor.
Public
BlockChain
Smart-
Healthcare
Zone
Smart-Grid
Zone
Smart-School
Zone
Smart-Home Zone
Node A
Node ENode D
Node B
Node C
Node M
(Master)
Behavior Monitor
Data Classification
Normal
Malicious
Machine
Learning
IoT Nodes
Data
Hashes
Local-BC-Ledger
Policy
T(A.D1)
T(A.D2)
T(B.D1)
T(C.D1)
...
T(C.D2)
T(D.D1)
TEE-Enabled
Fig. 4. Proposed IoT Blockchain Framework
4.2 Configuring Local Blockchain
A local private blockchain is deployed on a master node (Raspberry pi-3) of
each zone and populated with the hashes of transactions generated from smart-
devices. Hyperledger Fabric [9] a permissioned-BC is implemented as a local BC,
we discussed the workflow of fabric with IoT in our previous research [8]. For
prototype implementation, we use the dataset [6] of IoT traffic that has been
collected from various sensor communication. For each communication between
nodes or smart-devices, a transaction is created and stored in the local BC. Note
that in majority of the current BC technologies, actual data of IoT devices are
not stored in the BC due to overheads (i.e. processing & network).
In each zone, a single device having more computational power than others,
acts as a master or main node. Likewise in our model we use raspberry pi-3
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which is computationally and energy-efficient act as a master/main node. Once
the number of transactions reaches a pre-define blocksize, the master node creates
a new block and append it to local BC. Afterwards, we realise Intel SGX [3]
as a root-of-trust on top of BC to ensure that the execution of sensitive code
and applications are in trusted mode. As shown in Figure 2, the TEE-enabled
application is composed of trusted and untrusted part. For sensitive operations
like encryption and hashing a trusted-function is called. The function returns,
and the data inside the trusted part (enclave) remains in trusted memory and
are not accessible to external entities. Moreover, implementing SGX technology
on blockchain allows the proposed scheme to:
– Provide protection to the applications and data running on BC.
– Make sure about the application and data running on the BC is as expected
and correct.
– Provide end-to-end privacy to the application result, that cannot accessible
by others to inspect but the user.
– Ensure a BC-based validation by verifying the applications inside enclave is
neither tampered nor interrupted by any node in BC.
– Make sure about the validity of application and execution results, and not
tampered or fabricated by any malicious node.
4.3 Behavior Monitor
The main achievement in this research is to define a behavior monitor that
can classify the behavior of the devices and compute a level-of-trust for each
zone. As mentioned earlier, all the nodes (followers) in a specific zone do their
operations (read, write) via the master/main node. The scheme shown in Figure
4 depicts our proposed solution with all the entities in detail. Data or transactions
generated from device is considered as a behavior parameter of that device. The
master node is a device that centrally manage and organize all the incoming and
outgoing transactions.
When the data is reached to the master from the follower node, the master
node stores it in behavior monitor and append the corresponding hash to the
ledger in blockchain. A sequence-ID is assigned to every generated transaction
from the nodes while storing in behavior monitor, and a Hash-ID is also attached
to the corresponding hash in BC, for future reference. Finally, a deep learning
strategy is used to actively monitor the incoming data and classify them as
normal or malicious.
For the purpose of behavioral analysis and detection, we rely on Auto-
Encoders (AE) - a deep learning model [19] [27] for IoT devices, which is trained
from statistical based correlation features extracted from benign set of data. The
process of behavior detection and monitoring consists of the following sequen-
tial stages. (1) Data collection (2) Feature extraction (3) Training model (4)
Continuous Behavior Monitoring.
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Data Collection At this point, this research work use the dataset [6] that has
been collected from various sensors in the smart-home IoT network. To ensure
in real-time that the training dataset is clean and not malicious, normal traffic
from IoT devices are collected immediately after its joining to the IoT network.
Feature Extraction Whenever data from IoT device arrives, a behavioral
snapshot of the protocols and host associated to the data are stored in the
behavior monitor. The snapshot contains different parameters, i.e. source & des-
tination IP, MAC-address and port number, etc. We use the same set of features
included in the dataset for real-time detection of malicious activities in IoT
devices. For example, when an infected node in a zone spoof an IP, then the
features aggregated from the source & destination IP along with MAC-Address
will immediately mark as a malicious node because of unseen activity produced
from the respective spoofs IP.
Training Model As our baseline model for behavior detection, we use auto-
encoder that can build and maintain a learning model on all zone of IoT network.
An auto-encoder is a type of artificial neural network (ANN), which is trained to
re-structure the data after some compression. The compression ensures that the
model would be able to learn meaningful concepts and the correlation between
different set of features. For training purposes, we use two sets of data which
consists of only benign (normal) data. The first dataset is a training dataset
(TDS) which is used to train the auto-encoder by declaring input parameters
such as learning rate (lrn, size of gradient descent step), and epochs (number
of iterations through TDS). The second dataset OptDS (Optimization Dataset)
is used to optimize the above hyper-parameters (lrn & epochs) iteratively un-
til the mean square error (MSE) function between the input and output stop
decreasing. This stopping prevents overfitting in TDS and help out better detec-
tion results with future data. Later on, (OptDS) is used to identify normal and
malicious activities and false positive rate (FPR).
After completing model training and optimization, a threshold value (thv)
is set by which an instance of data is considered malicious. Empirically, it is
calculated by the sum of sample mean along with the standard deviation of
MSE on OptDS (see Equation 1).
thv = MSEOptDS + s(MSEOptDS) (1)
Continuous Behavior Monitoring Finally, the model is applied to continu-
ously observe the data and to label each instance as normal or malicious. Con-
sequently, an alert against abnormal behavior can be issued to indicate the IoT
device is malicious. Afterwards, for each IoT zone the behavior monitor cal-
culates a trust-level measurement and a threshold must be defined for every
use-case. Whenever a user or node from outside need to accessed data from any
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specific zone, our model is capable of disclosing the health of zone before estab-
lishing connection. This way a trusted environment can be built and informed
the user about the state of any particular zone before actual communication.
5 Experimental Analysis
In our experiments, we use a real-time large dataset available in [6], for realiz-
ing the proposed framework. The dataset contains both benign and malicious
(attacked) data. The data we choose from the dataset belongs to three different
devices which are Ecobee-thermostat, Webcam and Security-camera. For train-
ing and optimization, we use tensorflow and keras libraries in python language.
An auto-encoder make an input layer whose dimension is the same as the number
of features in the dataset, i.e. 115.
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After training, we apply a famous DDOS attack known as (mirai) to cal-
culate the detection time and accuracy of our model in comparison with other
machine learning algorithms. The same benign dataset is used to train three
other algorithms: SVM (support vector machine), Isolation forest and LOF (Lo-
cal Outlier Factor). Our method shows 99.2% results in terms of TPR (True
Positive Rate) and fewer FPR (False Positive Rate). Furthermore, as evident in
Figure 5 SVM and LOF have almost similar TPR value and found much better
than the isolation forest.
Next, we evaluate the average detection time for each algorithm as depicted
in Figure 6. The detection time recorded for all the three devices is lower than
the others in our case. The deep auto-encoder strategy outer-perform on all
the selected devices in terms of False-positive, True-positive and detection time.
This is because of the ability in auto-encoders to learn approximate complex
functions and non-linear structure mapping [25]. Moreover, as shown in Figure
6, our technique required much less time than the other algorithms which is
approximately 175±230ms to detect the attacks. This means that the launch
attack could be detected or alerted in less than a second and thus considers as
a substantial reduction in a typical time required for DDOS attacks [11].
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this research, we introduced a mechanism that can analyze device level trust
in IoT-Blockchain Infrastructure. A smart-home network is used as a use-case
for realizing the proposed research idea. For prototype implementation a Local
Blockchain on each zone is deployed on a master (raspberry pi-3) node that can
store every traffic coming from their follower (Raspberry pi-0)) in the form of
transactions. Behaviour Monitor is defined and configured on the Main/Master
node of each zone, which is capable of capturing and analyzing the runtime
activity of IoT devices. We apply a deep learning strategy (auto-encoders) for
realisation on the behavior monitor to classify the device and make a level-
of-trust. Furthermore, we incorporate Trusted Execution technology (TEE) as
a root-of-trust over the blockchain to provide security for sensitive code and
applications. Finally, the proposed framework could meet the current security
problems in IoT-Blockchain environment. And the evaluation of our study shows
its ability to mitigate the mainstream security requirements and resilience to
attacks.
This research work is our first step towards classification of devices in IoT-
Blockchain framework by means of deep learning. Our future plan is to investi-
gate a comparative study of other machine learning approaches for better results
in terms of performances and accuracy. Another goal would be to realize the
framework in other use-cases of IoT domain and analyze the outcomes. Finally,
in the near future we will provide a full implementation on various IoT devices
datasets along with full verification mechanism of zones in a trusted way and
make the source online to research community.
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